ID, Privacy, and Security

March 20, 2006

DRM Costs

A c|net test shows that DRM is computationally expensive and results in a measurable drain on battery life. For Microsoft’s WMA 10 DRM on a Creative Zen Vision:M, DRM resulted in 25% less battery life. The iPod and Fairplay only accounted for 8%. Whether it’s 8% or 25%, the shortened play time is a feature cost that puts the burden square on the user. You pay for the music and then you get less functionality than you would with uncrippled tracks. Ugh!

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February 08, 2006

CRAP: At the Whiteboard

David Berlind has a 3 minute whiteboard presentation on CRAP (content restiction, annulment, and protection), the new term for DRM. His advice: don’t buy anything with CRAP in it.

I like these little whiteboard presentations. They’re a lot like screencasts, short, simple to make, and easy to watch.

As long as we’re on the subject of CRAP, check out the analyses of iTunes U, Apples attempt to corral universities into the iTunes/iPod silo, by Jon Udell and Gardner Campbell. Jon got a load of crap (note the small case) from Mac zealots for daring to criticize Apple.

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February 06, 2006

A Model Regime for Privacy Protection

Daniel Solove and Chris Hoofnagle have published a paper entitled A Model Regime of Privacy Protection. The paper outlines patches that could be applied to current US law to increase privacy protection. In the paper, Solove and Hoofnagle build the model regime around Fair Use Practices, a set of very general principles:

• There must be no personal data record-keeping system whose very existence is secret.
• There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him is in a record and how it is used.
• There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him that was obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without his consent.
• There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of identifiable information about him.
• Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take precaution to prevent misuse of the data.

From these principles, they recommend specific changes to US law and then show how those changes would apply to ChoicePoint and other data brokers. I’d love to see an analysis of how the regime presented by Solve and Hoofnagle reinforce or are congruent with Kim Cameron’s seven laws.

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December 16, 2005

Computers That Control You

Commenting on my piece yesterday about TPM (trusted platform module) and computers that control you rather than the other way around, Jon Udell says:

Presumably no controls take effect unless the TPM is not merely activated by the operating system, but also pressed into service to guard some piece of protected content. So in theory it needn’t affect you if you’re creating rich media that you intend others to use freely, or if you’re using rich media that others have created with the same intent.

From Jon Udell: Technologies of control, technologies of use
Referenced Fri Dec 16 2005 16:54:14 GMT-0700 (MST)

Jon’s got a good point. However, I see TPM and TCP as a fundamental shift in how computers have always operated. In the past, we’ve always started from the assumption that software was infinitely malleable and we could write programs to do what we want. But, what if, for example, programs that let you create freely distributable rich media were deemed “dangerous” or “unsafe.” TPM and TCP give computer manufacturers the option of excluding certain software from ever operating. You can’t even say “well, then I’ll run Linux” because they might choose to exclude that as well.

I don’t mean to sound like a conspiracy theory nutjob. There’s certainly futures with TCP that are not as bleak as all that, but for the first time, TCP opens a path to a possible future where general purpose computers disappear and are replaced by unhackable appliances. There are people who view such a world as good and desirable. Those people have been winning some lately.

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November 10, 2005

Orrin's Got a New Gig

I think Orrin must be the CTO for Sony BMG.

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October 19, 2005

Tracking Your Printer

The EFF has been working to crack the code that some color printers put on every printed page. It’s been long known that printer manufacturers put these codes in many color printers at the behest of the Secret Service, who’s concerned about the potential for counterfeiting. The EFF, however, has revealed just how these codes work (with images).

The images really bring this home. Just think about every document you print containing tracking codes that link it back to the printer in your office or home. The privacy concerns are huge. Imagine that you print a handbill complaining about working conditions and post it in the lunchroom. You might have thought it was anonymous, but in fact, your employer can link it right to the source. I’m not really a big privacy freak, but I don’t like this at all.

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June 30, 2005

Legislative Solutions to Security

Senators Patrick Leahy (D, VT) and Arlen Specter (R, PA) have proposed legislation to “deal with” losses of personally identifying information and the security problems that lead to it. I’m not convinced it’s the right architecture. Comprehensive legislative solutions seldom are. I’ve written more about the legislation at “Between the Lines.”

One thing I learned working for government is that if you don’t solve your own problems, the legislature will do it for you–and you probably won’t like the results. So it was with Sarbanes-Oxley and, perhaps, now with a data privacy and security.

From | Between the Lines |
Referenced Thu Jun 30 2005 09:23:49 GMT-0600 (MDT)

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June 17, 2005

Bluetooth Can Be Hacked in Milliseconds

A presentation by Yaniv Shaked and Avishai Wool of Tel Aviv University at MobiSys2005 showed how Bluetooth devices can be hacked, even with security enabled, in 0.6 seconds. A story at TechWeb gives some details and the full paper is also available.

It’s a real shame that things like Bluetooth are aren’t designed with better security in mind from the start. It’s just getting some traction and the convenience is unbelievable.

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June 09, 2005

McNealy Was Right

A recent post by Don Park about a girl who refused to clean up after her dog and was “outted” by a camera phone totting netizen shows that Scott McNealy may have been right when he said “You have zero privacy anyway, get over it.” The girl is apparently being hounded in a nationwide witch hunt.

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May 31, 2005

Netcraft's Anti-Phishing Toolbar

Firefox anti-phishing toolbar

Netcraft has released a version of their anti-phishing toolbar for Firefox. The toolbar ranks web sites based on a number of factors including age and reports of abuse and displays a “risk bar.” I installed it last week and was gleefully anticipating a phishing email to test it out. Naturally, my wait wasn’t long. Clicking on the link in the mail took me to a warning dialog box warning me that the site might be a phishing site and asking if I wanted to continue. I declined and was taken to a Netcraft splash page.

I’ll probably uninstall it since I’m not all that worried about falling for a phishing scam, but I might install it on my Mom’s browser.

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April 28, 2005

Visa and MasterCard Cracking Down on Small Merchants

Visa and MasterCard are cracking down on the security of small merchants who take credit cards online. The card associations have required security assessments from larger merchants for some time, but this is the first time they’ve required smaller merchants to certify. An article in the Wall Street Journal notes that it’s for the merchant’s own good:

The credit-card companies have little choice but to crack down. While it’s true small companies may be less attractive targets than large ones, size is not a good measure of risk, experts say. Hackers regularly use automated programs to scour the Internet for computers with known security holes, which they can then attack at their leisure.

E-commerce companies are still in a mode of trying to keep things working, says Mr. Freund, and not in a mode of keeping things secure. But as large merchants step up security, Mr. Freund believes hackers will focus on targets with weaker defenses, often smaller firms.

The consequences of a break-in could be devastating; many small companies live and die by their ability to build a base of repeat customers, and a data loss can unleash a wave of customer defections. Companies that suffer security breaches will also face penalties and extra scrutiny from Visa and MasterCard.

From WSJ.com - Enterprise
Referenced Thu Apr 28 2005 09:23:44 GMT-0600 (MDT)

Certification isn’t easy. You have to answer yes to every question on a fourteen page questionnaire. For many small companies, without a full time IT staff, becoming compliant will be a fairly onerous process. The questionnaire is based on the following twelve requirements:

1. Install and maintain a working firewall to protect data
2. Keep security patches up-to-date
3. Protect stored data
4. Encrypt data sent across public networks
5. Use and regularly update anti-virus software
6. Restrict access by “need to know”
7. Assign unique ID to each person with computer access
8. Don’t use vendor-supplied defaults for passwords and security parameters
9. Track all access to data by unique ID
10. Regularly test security systems and processes
11. Implement and maintain an information security policy
12. Restrict physical access to data

Nothing too shocking here for anyone who’s thought about computer security before. The price of being connected and participating in the Internet economy is living by the card association rule-sets. The result is better security for all of us.

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January 29, 2005

Lexus Infections

It had to happen: Now your car can get a virus from your Bluetooth phone. I was just talking to someone yesterday about how they love their LS430 and the Bluetooth integration to the built-in handsfree. Now, SC Magazine is reporting that some Lexus and Landcruiser models are susceptible to a virus they pick up from mobile phones serving as the vector.

Lexus cars may be vulnerable to viruses that infect them via mobile phones. Landcruiser 100 models LX470 and LS430 have been discovered with infected operating systems that transfer within a range of 15 feet.

From SC Magazine
Referenced Sat Jan 29 2005 14:32:12 GMT-0700

The virus infects the car’s navigation system, which is based on the Windows OS. Having a virus in the navigation system probably isn’t life threatening to most people, but one could imagine scenarios. Life-critical systems like brakes and steering are, at least for now, not controlled by systems that rely on Windows.

Last year 13,000 Bank of America ATMs were infected by the Slammer worm after they moved to a Windows-based operating system.

Some might ask why someone doesn’t invent something to detect viruses. It turns out that that problem is equivalent to the halting problem and thus impossible to solve. They best we can do is to restrict virus vectors and protect against known variants.

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January 03, 2005

More Identity on the Gillmor Gang

There were nine of us on last week’s Gillmor Gang. Doug called it the “GIllmor Gaggle.” The topic was identity. Here’s what Doug says about it:

This week The Gang digs deeper into digital identity with a panel of experts. It begins as a Kumbaya of identity vendors and technologies, but by the second half the gloves come off. Craig points out that everyone has built silos so far because there have been no alternatives. Is the idea of a Microsoft silo “old fashioned thinking,” as Kim suggests, defending the company he joined not all that long ago? He then presents the first five of his seven Laws of Identity — clearly well thought out and vendor independent as all agree. Everyone also agrees that no identity solution can succeed without the cooperation and participation of Microsoft, but Dave is skeptical given the company’s history in identity management. Phil points out that PKI hasn’t succeeded, and Kim suggests it’s because PKI violated his 4th Law of Identity. And Doc suggests that digital identity needs a ‘key personality’ in the same way as Dave has played a lead role in RSS and blogging. Make sure you listen to this one all the way through.

From IT Conversations: The Gillmor Gang - December 31, 2004
Referenced Mon Jan 03 2005 13:14:03 GMT-0700

The discussion was just starting to get interesting when we had to end. That’s too bad since this is a conversation that needs to continue.

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December 21, 2004

BYU Tie to Discovery of Google Flaw

One of the students at Rice University who discovered the security hole in Google’s desktop search tool was a recent graduate from BYU’s M.S. program, Seth Nielson, who’s now pursuing his Ph.D. at Rice with Dan Wallach (of eVoting fame). Apparently, the flaw was found as part of a class project at Rice. Google was immediately notified and given a chance to fix the flaw before the problem was made know publicly. Reportedly Seth has been offered an internship at Google this summer. :-) Here’s a technical report (PDF) that gives the details.

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December 14, 2004

Gillmor Gang on Digital Identity

Doug’s posted the digital identity show we recorded on The Gillmor Gang last Friday.

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December 11, 2004

Say Hello to Your New National ID Card

I’ve maintained for some time that Congress was unlikely to create a national ID card and instead force standards upon the states that created a de facto national ID card using driver’s licenses. Last week’s bill overhauling national intelligence did just that:

The intelligence bill, which stemmed from recommendations of the independent commission that investigated the 9-11 attacks, requires the U.S. Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security to establish minimum identification standards for drivers’ licenses and other state-issued identification cards. If a state’s license does not meet the standards in two years, federal agencies will not be allowed accept it as valid identification for such purposes as boarding airplanes and many other common transactions of daily life.

The bill also sets a two-year deadline for states to conform with minimum standards for birth certificates. Those will be set by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

The intelligence bill would require that each license include a digital photograph of the holder as well as the holder’s full name, date of birth, gender and drivers’ license or personal identification number. While some states already meet all these requirements, others do not. States also will be required to meet stiffer standards for the documentation they accept as proof of identity from license applicants, for the processes by which they verify those documents and for the means by which licenses are issued.

From News: Drivers’ Licenses to Face New Federal Standards - Dec 10 2004 04:01AM
Referenced Sat Dec 11 2004 15:00:20 GMT-0700

There would have been a huge uproar if Congress had passed a national ID card program. This will sail by with nary a whimper.

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December 10, 2004

Interview Day

I just got off the phone with Blake Harris who’s writing a story on blogging in the public sector for Public CIO. We had a great chat about the uses of blogs in state and local government. I pointed him at the blogs of the Chief of Police and City Manager for Eden Prairie, MN. These guys are still at it and their blogs appear as great as they did when I first saw them. Makes you want to visit.

Just before that I was the guest on this week’s edition of The Gillmor Gang. We talked about federating digital identities. There are some interesting models developing and we’re seeing some real competition in business models for networked identity with Identity Commons, Sxip, Shibboleth, and Ping ID. You’ll notice that I don’t place Liberty Alliance of WS-Federation in that list. That’s because I don’t see them as business models, but more as technology platforms.

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December 09, 2004

PubCookie

If you’ve got multiple Web servers (IIS or Apache) and you’d like users to be able to authenticate on all of them from a single authentication source (like LDAP or NIS), then Pubcookie, a system open-sourced by the University of Washington, might be what you’re looking for. This page shows how it works.

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December 06, 2004

Laws of Identity and Symmetric Relationship Treatment

Kim Cameron continues to explore Laws of Identity. He points out that this is not some philosophical exploration, but one bent on creating a practical basis for a universal identity system:

I’d like toÊtake a moment to look at what I’m trying to achieve with thisÊexploration of the Laws of Identity.

I’ve pointed out already thatÊour discussion hereÊis not about the “philosophy of identity” - which is aÊcompellingÊbut entirely orthogonal pursuit.

Instead, I am trying to revealÊthe set of “objective” dynamics that willÊconstrain the definition of anÊidentity systemÊcapable ofÊbeing widely enough accepted that it can enable distributed computing on a universal scale.Ê I doÊnot propose my lawsÊas “moral imperatives”, but rather asÊexplanations of dynamicsÊwhich must be mastered to craftÊsuch a universal system.Ê

From Kim Cameron’s Identity Weblog
Referenced Mon Dec 06 2004 10:14:34 GMT-0700

This practical basis is the reason for their appeal to me. His first three laws are:

1. Law No. 1: The Owner Decides - Technical identity systems MUST only reveal information identifying a user with the user’s consent.Ê
2. Law No. 2: Minimal Disclosure - The solution which disclosesÊthe leastÊidentifying information isÊthe mostÊstable, long-term solution.
3. Law No. 3: The Fewest Parties - Technical identity systems MUST be designed so the disclosure of identifying information is limited to parties having a necessary andÊjustifiable place inÊa given identity relationship.

I think you’d agree that these are pretty practical. I posted an example of why Law No. 2 is important last week, relating it to the security principle of least privilege. So far, the most controversial law of the three seems to be No. 1. That’s probably because so few identity systems abide by it.

Equally problematic is getting a handle on what the user’s rights really are with respect to identifying information. Let me give an example. Suppose Kim walks into convenience store and purchases a bottle of soda. Later, I come in an ask the clerk “Did Kim buy a bottle of Coke earlier?” Does Law No. 1 preclude the clerk from telling me without Kim’s assent? Many would say yes, but in fact, that transaction is jointly owned by the two parties to the transaction. The transaction is not strictly speaking identity information, although it certainly does tell us something about Kim, the transaction is better thought of as relationship information.

Here’s another look at that same scenario. Suppose, I go up to Kim after he’s been in the store and ask “Did the store sell you a bottle of Coke?” Does Kim have the right to tell me? Practically speaking the store doesn’t mind, but suppose they did. The transaction has as much identity information about the store as it does about Kim. Relationship data links two or more identities, telling us something about each of them.

I believe that much of our talk about identity, and about privacy, is confounded by our collective myopia concerning relationships, or data about how identities are linked. When we look at it from just one side, we’re likely to mistakenly build systems that asymmetrically protect relationship data. These systems are inherently unfair and thus prone to controversy. So, I’ll add something that I think needs to be in Kim’s laws:

• Treat Relationship Data Symmetrically - Relationship records (i.e. records that link one or more parties) MUST be treated symmetrically for the identity system to be fair.

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November 30, 2004

Done Writing

Yesterday, I turned in the final chapters for my upcoming O’Reilly book on digital identity. There’s still plenty of work left with editing and what not, but its good to have the writing done. The book has three sections. Part I is about digital identity concepts. Part II is about digital identity technology, and Part III is about building an identity management architecture, or IMA. An IMA is aimed at creating flexible, interoperable identity infrastructure in loosely coupled organizations. I’m pretty happy with how it turned out.

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